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Abstract 
The paper interrogates the status, nature and significance of epistemological relativism as a 
key element of constructionism and critical realism. It finds that epistemological relativism is 
espoused by authorities in critical realism and marginalised or displaced in the field of 
management and organisation studies, resulting in forms of analysis that are empirically, but 
not fully critically, realist. This evaluation prompts reflection on the question of whether, how 
and with what implications, epistemological relativism might be recast at the heart of critical 
realist studies of management and organisation.  
 
Keywords: Critical realism, constructionism, epistemology, methodology, paradigms, 
relativism, ontology. 
 
Introduction 
 ‗Realism‘ and ‗constructionism‘ii have emerged as broad categories and as antinomies 
for labelling forms of analysis and ascribing theoretical allegiances. Dialogue between their 
respective affiliates has, however, been muted; and this limitation  has been compounded by 
each ‗rendering themselves intelligible‘ in opposition to, rather than engagement with, the 
other (Gergen 1998: 153). An outcome has been a solidifying of realism/constructionism as a 
‗bi-polar hierarchy‘ (Van Maanen 1995). Scholarship located and positioned on one or other 
side of the divide in a way has tended to cult-ivate and justify a  disinclination to give careful 
consideration to the other‘s claims (see for instance Edwards, Ashmore et al. 1995).  
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 A widely held view is that realist and constructionist positions are divided inter alia 
on epistemology, with relativism being the province of constructionists.  This understanding 
is, however, difficult to reconcile with statements from leading advocates of critical realism 
(CR) who have stressed the centrality of epistemological relativism. Lawson (2003b), for 
example, writes: 
‗I do accept the relativity of knowledge. I do not suppose for a moment that social ontology 
or anything else could be represented or produced in other than a manner that is conditioned 
by our socio-cultural (or biological or physical) determinations. This is precisely what lies 
behind my acceptance of an epistemological relativism…within the realist project (and 
perhaps more widely…)‘ 
Lawson continues: 
‗[epistemological relativism] expresses the idea that our categories, frameworks of thinking, 
modes of analysis, ways of seeing things, habits of thought, dispositions of every kind, 
motivating concerns, interests, values and so forth, are affected by our life paths and socio-
cultural situations and thereby make a difference in how we can and do ―see‖ or know or 
approach things, and indeed they bear on which we seek to know‘ (ibid: 162, emphasis 
added) 
 If, as this passage suggests, critical realism incorporates epistemological relativism, a 
number of questions are begged that are of direct relevance to students of management and 
organization studies, including:  
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1) What place does epistemological relativism
iii
 occupy in the formulation of critical realism 
(CR)?  
2) How is CR, including its espousal of epistemological relativism, disseminated and 
translated into the field of management and organization studies (MOS)? 
3) What are the implications of embracing epistemological relativism fully for the identity of 
CR and its application to MOS?  
 
 To address these questions, we begin by outlining our understanding of CR before 
surveying its presence in MOS. We then review a number of empirical studies that claim a 
CR pedigree prior to evaluating the extent to which epistemological relativism is incorporated 
into such analyses. These reflections lead us to consider whether, and how, epistemological 
relativism might be recast at the heart of CR, and the possible implications of such recasting 
for CR contributions to MOS. Our polyphonic response to this issue comprises a sceptical 
and an optimistic assessment. The sceptical assessment identifies epistemological relativism 
as an anomalous element whose closer engagement threatens to destabilise CR and 
precipitate a shift to some alternative form of analysis. The optimistic stance entertains the 
possibility of epistemological relativism being more fully appreciated, recovered and 
incorporated within CR analysis so as to facilitate its strengthening and extension. 
 
Our understanding of CR 
 Prior to outlining key features of CR, we briefly explicate our own stance. We attend 
to CR as a discourse - that is, as a structured system of differential positions that has a 
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‗material character‘ and confers meaning to its elements (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: pp. 105-
108)
iv
. This stance may alarm those who (mistakenly, in our view) conflate interest in 
discourse with idealism, or with the analysis of texts abstracted from their constitutive 
embeddedness in the materiality of social relations. This (mis)understanding may be 
applicable to some forms of discourse theory and analysis but, as Laclau explains in a debate 
with Bhaskar, a principle architect of CR, a conception of discourse ‗could, if you prefer, be 
replaced by that of practice‘ (Bhaskar and Laclau 2002: 81). And when elaborating his 
conception of discourse theory with which we are broadly sympathetic, Laclau explicitly 
states that ‗the main philosophical approach that [discourse theory] is opposed to is idealism‘. 
This conception of discourse theory, which ‗sustains the irreducibility of the real to 
discourse‘ (Bhaskar and Laclau 2002: 81), is also, we suggest, broadly but incompletely 
consistent with the realist position advanced by Bhaskar (1998b: 16) for whom the activities, 
theories and philosophies of science, in which we understand CR to be included, are 
conceived as ‗artificial objects'. Such activities, theories and philosophies are artificial objects 
in the sense that they are constructed out of available ‗facts and theories, paradigms and 
models, methods and techniques of enquiry available to a particular scientific school or 
worker‘ (Bhaskar 1998b: 16) We say that agreement on this point is ‗incomplete‘ as we 
assess CR, and especially its engagement in the field of MOS, to be susceptible to 
forgetfulness of its own subscription to, and advocacy of, epistemological relativism. 
 Having sketched our position on CR, we now outline what we regard as CR‘s key 
features. In doing so, we acknowledge the impossibility of presenting an authoritative, 
unitary and definitive account of CR.  Our response to this difficulty is (i) to acknowledge 
CR‘s status as an ongoing programme; and (ii) to portray those features that are shared by 
proponents of CR who are widely regarded, from within and without CR, as authorities on 
the subject. Amongst them are Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson 
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and Alan Norrie who collectively edited Critical Realism: Essential Readings (1998). We 
take this volume, together with a number of Bhaskar‘s texts as ‗authoritative‘ in respect of 
CR.  
 The Transitive-Intransitive Distinction. A fundamental characteristic of the CR 
project is its insistence upon establishing and ‗sustain[ing] a clear concept of the reality of 
being - of the intransitive or ontological dimension - in the face of the relativity of knowledge 
- in the transitive or epistemological dimension‘ (Bhaskar 1998a: x, text modified).  CR 
articulates and defends a ‗logics of reference‘ (Bhaskar in Bhaskar and Laclau 2002) in which 
knowledge has two dimensions: one transitive, artificial, dimension constituted by the 
concepts we use as references to the world; the other, intransitive and constituted by the 
world qua referent. CR pays particular attention to what it identifies as confusions of these 
dimensions. Accordingly, the interpretation of statements about being as statements about 
knowledge of being is characterised as an epistemic fallacy (Bhaskar 1986: 6); and the 
obverse ‗reduction of knowledge to being‘ (Bhaskar 1986: 23) is referred to as an ontic 
fallacy.  
 The idea of an ‗intransitive dimension of knowledge‘ is especially prone to 
miscomprehension and confusion. Consider a drink served to Sally. If Sally thinks of a cold 
drink, she relies on and re/produces language and concepts (the transitive objects of 
knowledge) through which she refers to her drink (the intransitive object of knowledge). The 
key distinction in CR between transitive and intransitive is between reference and referent 
and not - as the terms in/transitive may suggest - a distinction between mutable and 
immutable features of reality (cf. infra for a discussion). Sally‘s drink (the intransitive object 
of Sally‘s knowledge) may become warmer or colder just as the meaning invested in the 
concept of a ‗drink‘ (the transitive object of Sally‘s knowledge) may change over time. 
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Moreover, CR holds that the transitive dimension forms part of the intransitive dimension. 
Knowledge does not exist in a separate world: the transitive is differentiated from, but not 
exterior to, the intransitive.  So, if Bobby were to study what Sally thinks of her drink, then 
her thoughts and the language/knowledge she relies on would constitute Bobby‘s intransitive 
objects of knowledge. In this case, the transitive objects of Bobby‘s knowledge would 
comprise the knowledge and theories (sociological or otherwise) through which he 
understands Sally‘s sense-making.   
 Generative Mechanisms. With specific reference to the development of scientific 
knowledge, the abstractions which comprise explanations are understood to have their 
‗grounds… in the real stratification (and ontological depth) of nature and society‘ (Bhaskar 
1998a: xvi). Such abstractions, Bhaskar contends, ‗…are not subjective classifications of an 
undifferentiated empirical reality‘ (Bhaskar 1998a: xvi), but, rather, are ‗attempts to grasp… 
precisely the generative mechanisms and causal powers which account in all their complex 
and multiple determinations for the concrete phenomena of human history‘ (Bhaskar 
1998a:xvi). Generative mechanisms are located within CR‘s stratified, depth ontology where 
the intransitive dimension (see above) is conceived to comprise three domains (Bhaskar 
1978; see also Fleetwood 2005): (i) the empirical which is that of experience (e.g. Sally‘s 
perception of cold); (ii) the actual which is one of events as well as experiences (e.g. Sally‘s 
drink burning her lips); and (iii)the real which includes mechanisms in addition to 
experiences and events (e.g. the molecular structure of Sally‘s drink that makes it prone to 
slow changes in temperature). Generative mechanisms are conceived to be ―real and distinct 
from the patterns of events that they generate; just as events are real and distinct from the 
experiences in which they are apprehended‖ (Bhaskar 1998b: 41). It is these generative 
mechanisms, according to CR, that are retroduced in the course of scientific study of the 
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natural and social worlds, and subsequently subjected to empirical scrutiny and rational 
judgement vis à vis the claims of competing explanations.  
 Judgmental Rationality. Distinguishing the dimension of ontology from that of 
epistemology (see above) is essential, advocates of CR argue, if there are to be shared 
reference points for making rational judgements between alternative theories. Failure to 
uphold this distinction is seen to ‗render problematic the idea of a rational choice between 
―incommensurable‖ theories and to encourage (superidealist) scepticism about the existence 
of a theory-independent world‘ (Bhaskar 1998a: x-xi). Alternative theories and explanations 
are not just different as a consequence of their suppositions. As ‗―incommensurable‖ 
theories‘ about ‗the same world‘ (Bhaskar 1998a: x-xi), they are understood to compete and 
conflict in their claims to advance upon established explanations. 
 Epistemological Relativism. The process of retroductive judgement by which 
generative mechanisms are identified is understood to be mediated by historically and 
culturally partial processes of interrogation. For instance, in different epochs, Sally would 
more likely attribute the gradual cooling of her drink to the weakening of the element of fire, 
or to the transfer of kinetic energy, or to particle vibrations. The criteria employed for 
preferring one explanation rather than another is, at least in part, dependent on the historico-
cultural community in which debates about competing claims are staged (Roy Bhaskar, 
personal communication). Retroductive judgments provide possible but historically 
contingent explanations of certain states of affairs. Their apparently compelling ―necessity‖ 
is, then, more congruent with what Kant terms ―problematic‖ rather than ―apodictic‖ 
judgments. It is relevant to underscore how epistemological relativism means more than mere 
fallibilism (i.e. the assumption that every form of knowledge is open to error). It is not only a 
matter of every knowledge being potentially ‗wrong‘ but also, and most crucially, a matter of 
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knowledge being historically transient (a product of our position, perspective, histories), and 
of acquiring its meaningfulness and value relative to the time, place, and position of the 
knower (see Bhaskar 1989: 19). Had Sally lived in the times of Parmenides, she would have 
lacked the conceptual framework to refer to heat as ‗kinetic energy‘ or ‗particle vibrations‘. 
Nonetheless, the framework familiar to her would have enabled Sally to defend an elemental 
theory of heat at least as convincingly as most people living in the 21
st
 Century. 
 Discussion  
Two understandings of the transitive-intransitive distinction seem to cohabit in the CR 
literature. One understanding interprets the intransitive as the realm of the immutable objects 
of the natural world that exist independently of human activity and the transitive as the 
historically transient realm of human activity. In this interpretation, ‗transitive‘ and 
‗intransitive‘ refer to two ontologically distinct realms of reality. This understanding is shared 
by commentators such as Burkitt (1999), King (1999a; 1999b) and Newton (2007). For 
instance, Burkitt suggests that: 
‗in the distinction between transitive and intransitive [Bhaskar] has 
separated out what appear to be two distinct realms and, despite his own 
best intentions, divided the ontological realm from the social. That is, 
reality appears to be governed by its own laws in some independent realm 
that is distinct from humans, and transformational activity seems 
confined only to the social-epistemic‘ (Burkitt 1999: 73). 
This interpretation of the transitive-intransitive distinction is partly justified by Bhaskar‘s 
(Bhaskar 1978) analysis of the activity of natural scientists:  
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‗Our knowledge is ‗of‘ things which are not produced by men at all: the 
specific gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism of 
light propagation. None of these ‗objects of knowledge‘ depend upon 
human activity. If men ceased to exist, sound would continue to travel 
and heavy bodies would fall to the earth in exactly the same way, though 
ex hypothesi there would be no-one to know it. Let us call these, in an 
unavoidable technical neologism, the intransitive objects of knowledge‘. 
(Bhaskar 1978: 21) 
It is worth remarking, however, that Bhaskar insists elsewhere that social structures are both 
intransitive (Bhaskar 1998/1979: 47) and dependent on people‘s conceptions of what they are 
doing in their activity (Bhaskar 1998/1979: 38). In doing so, how is Bhaskar postulating an 
antinomy of CR, as claimed by King (1999b) and other critics?  
 Another understanding – that we favour (cf. supra) – interprets the distinction 
between transitive and intransitive as a distinction between reference (which is by definition 
knowledge) and referent (which may or may not be knowledge). In this interpretation, the 
transitive is nested in the intransitive and agents‘ concepts are constitutive, though not 
exhaustive, of the social. The social is not assumed to exist independently of human 
activities. 
 At the same time, Bhaskar nonetheless distinguishes CR from idealism by maintaining that 
the act of scientific discovery does not create ipso facto the intransitive object of discovery, 
be it social or natural. As he puts it 
‗Note that to affirm the distinct identity of thought and intransitive object, 
or of the epistemic2 and the ontic2, is not to deny, but on the contrary 
11 
presupposes not just that thought is (ontologically2) part of being, but 
also the possibility of causal relations between the being of a knowledge 
and the distinct being of its object – in both the cognitive and conative 
‗directions of fit‘. This holds both in particular cases, e.g. in the causal 
efficacy of an object in the process of its cognition (e.g. in experiment) 
and in the possible reciprocal efficacy of knowledge, once achieved, on 
its object (e.g. in the mining of a mineral, once its presence has been 
detected); and as between knowledge and being generally, e.g. in 
emergence and technology respectively‘ (Bhaskar 1986: 53, n.92) 
 
To return to our example of Sally‘s drinking habits, Bobby may discover that she has a 
preference for lukewarm coffee. This discovery presupposes that Sally‘s preference (the 
intransitive object of Bobby‘s knowledge) pre-existed Bobby‘s (transitive) knowledge. It may 
also be argued, in turn, that Bobby‘s discovery, when known by Sally, is likely to influence 
her future preferences. In response to his quizzical reaction, she may start to drink, and in 
time prefer, hot coffee, in line with contemporary, socially sanctioned, taste. Yet, the 
transformation of Sally‘s taste is not instantaneous. If Sally is influenced by Bobby‘s 
assessment, the transformation occurs in the future and is mediated through processes (e.g. 
Sally subsequent interpretation and so on) that are irreducible to Bobby‘s knowledge. 
Our understanding of the transitive-intransitive distinction is shared by leading CR 
authorities, including Archer (2000), Lawson (1998) and Sayer (2000: 10). Thus, Archer 
(2000: 465) specifies in a response to King (1999a) that the dualism is analytical, not 
philosophical: (intransitive) structures are only held to emerge from the activities of people 
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and conversely structures only exert any effect when mediated through the (transitive) 
activities of people. Similarly, Lawson suggests that: 
'because social structure is existentially dependent upon human agency 
(as well as vice versa) the procedures of social science are likely to differ 
in various ways from those of natural science. However, it does not 
follow from this that social structures are other than intransitive. To 
describe certain objects or features as intransitive is merely to indicate 
that they exist at least in part independently of any knowledge claims of 
which they are the referents. Thus intransitive objects of knowledge need 
be no more fixed or enduring than transitive ones. If I am studying the 
thought of a second person, for example, her or his thought constitutes an 
intransitive object of my enquiry.‘ (Lawson 1998). 
 
As we turn from the writings of CR authorities to consider examples of avowedly CR 
analysis in MOS, it is remarkable how little attention is paid to the (central) transitive-
intransitive distinction upon which CR‘s combination of ontological realism and 
epistemological relativism is based. This silence prompts reflection upon the translation and 
dissemination of CR into MOS.   
 
The Dissemination of CR into Management and Organization Studies 
 A number of researchers in MOS have identified CR as a promising approach (see for 
instance Mutch, Delbridge et al. 2006). Indeed, according to Reed (2005b - see also 
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Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004a; 2005a), CR has been gaining momentum to the point of 
inspiring a ―realist turn‖. To this turn, he attributes the following characteristics. First, the 
turn ―provide(s) an overarching explanatory framework and logic‖ for substantive research 
on organisations (Reed 2005b: 1637). Second, it aspires to gain access to a ―deeper level of 
social and organizational reality, not readily available to direct observation or description…‖ 
(Reed 2005b: 1639). These characteristics chime with our earlier account of the first and 
second of CR‘s four key elements and also, potentially, to the discriminating powers of 
judgemental rationality. Reed also suggests that CR is open to multiple research methods as it 
―does not legitimate or license any particular substantive theoretical perspective or body of 
social theorising‖ (Reed 2005b: 1637-1638). As will become clear, we are not fully 
persuaded that CR can readily accommodate diverse research methods or bodies of social 
theorizing; or, at least, it seems to us that the requirements associated with key elements of 
CR place limits on their scope.   
Finally, Reed positions CR in opposition to all forms of postmodernism and poststructuralism 
(typically of Foucauldian inspiration); and he counters these with CR-informed approaches, 
such as critical discourse analysis (e.g. Fairclough 1995; Fairclough, Jessop et al. 2002). As 
our focus upon epistemological relativism perhaps implies, we question the plausibility of 
positioning CR in diametric opposition to all forms of poststructuralism. In our assessment, 
leading advocates of CR (e.g. Bhaskar) and at least some forms of poststructuralist analysis 
(e.g. Laclau‘s social theory of hegemony) share an acceptance of  the contextual, theory-
dependence of knowledge production, and an associated rejection of the dogmatic 
(empirically realist) assumption that such dependence can be eliminated by methodological 
diversity, eclecticism or virtuosity. Our attentiveness to CR‘s espousal of epistemological 
relativism is intended, in part, to excavate the basis of our reservations about how CR has 
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been characterized and positioned by those (e.g. Reed, Fleetwood, Fairclough) who advocate 
it as a promising approach within MOS. 
 
Debating CR in MOS 
 
 Dialogue between advocates of  ‗realism‘ and ‗constructionism‘, as distinct from petty 
sniping, has been limited across the social sciences (see Parker 1998 for a partial exception). 
In MOS, the most cited example is an exchange between Mir and Watson (2000; 2001) and 
Kwan and Tsang (2001) (but see also exchanges between Reed 2005a; 2005b and Contu and 
Willmott 2005; and between Tsoukas, 1994 and Willmott 1996). Mir and Watson (2001) 
claim a ‗constructivist‘ monopoly on sensitivity to theory dependence. This is challenged by 
Kwan and Tsang (2001) who point out that this sensitivity is incorporated within critical 
realism, in contrast to forms of ‗dogmatic realism‘ that ignore this theory dependence or 
conceive of it as a source of bias amenable to progressive elimination. CR is distinguished by 
Kwan and Tsang (2001) from what they describe as a more ‗radical‘ stance in which the 
theoretical stance of the researcher is conceived to ‗determine  research such that ‗reality has 
no input to and control over scientific findings‘. The latter, ‗constructivist‘ view, they 
contend,  ‗quickly leads to epistemological relativism‘ (Kwan and Tsang 2001: 1164-1165, 
emphasis added). This positioning and assessment of CR is at once confusing and revealing. 
Along with other advocates and defenders of CR within MOS, Kwan and Tsang erroneously 
conceive of CR‘s distinctiveness in terms of its rejection of epistemological relativism. As we 
have seen, however, epistemological relativism is a central plank of the CR credo. In effect, 
Kwan and Tsang conflate ‗epistemological relativism‘ with ‗epistemic fallacy‘ (cf supra). 
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Appreciating the centrality of epistemological relativism for CR, we contend, is of critical 
importance for enabling CR, as a ‗philosophical underlabourer‘ (Mutch 2007), to guide 
scholarly activities undertaken in its name.  
Epistemological relativism: lost in dissemination 
 
 In the process of its adoption within management and organization studies (MOS), the 
centrality of epistemological relativism within CR has apparently been forgotten. To explore 
the dissemination of CR into MOS, we focus upon the contributions to Ackroyd and 
Fleetwood (2000) and Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004). The rationale for concentrating on 
these texts is that they were selected by the editors as illustrative, or as exemplary, of CR-
infused contributions to MOS. The stratagem, we believe, offers a firmer basis for evaluation 
than, say, an examination of a random selection of articles from the population of 136 pieces 
published between 1990-2006 (see Appendix). Had we adopted the latter approach, we could, 
quite justifiably, have been criticised for analysing papers that, for whatever reason, include 
the term ‗critical realism‘ in the title, abstract or key words but are assessed to be tangentially 
CR in inspiration or application. These concerns also inform our decision to adopt Fleetwood 
and Ackroyd‘s distinction between ‗three areas in which CR ideas have been found of 
particular relevance to organization and management studies‘ (Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004: 
4).  These three areas are: 
  
1) the meta-theory of management and organization studies which is distinct from 
substantive social scientific theorising but may inspire substantive theories and ‗indicat[e] 
likely sources of bias and error‘ (Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004: 4);  
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2) the methodology of MOS in which category are placed contributions to the two collections 
that reflect on the appropriateness of specific research methods to their subject matters; and   
3) Examples of new substantive social science research written from a critical realist point of 
view that are illustrative of the payoff of adopting a CR perspective for MOS researchers. 
(Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004: 5).  
 
 When examining the contents of the Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2000; 2004) 
collections, we found that epistemological relativism occupies a visible but subordinate 
position in meta-theory papers and then almost vanishes in the more substantive 
contributions. To the best of our knowledge, the most complete account of CR‘s 
epistemological relativism in MOS scholarship appears in Fleetwood‘s (2004) contribution. 
which underscores how CR understands that knowledge of the social world is inescapably 
mediated by available conceptual resources:  
 
‗There is no theory-neutral observation, description, interpretation, theorisation, explanation, 
or whatever. There is, in other words, no unmediated access to the world: access is always 
mediated. Whenever we reflect upon an entity, our sense data is always mediated by a pre-
existing stock of conceptual resources which we use to interpret, make sense of and 
understand what it is, and take appropriate action... (Fleetwood 2004: 30).  
 
 It is evident from this passage that, in Fleetwood‘s assessment, the metatheoretical 
explication of CR incorporates an understanding that forms of observation, interpretation and 
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explanation are mediated by theory.  Whether this extends beyond fallibilism is unclear but, 
as emphasised earlier, CR authorities conceive of processes of interrogation and adjudication 
as incorrigibly culturally mediated, and not simply methodologically imperfect. To what 
extent, then, is the espoused centrality of epistemological relativism in CR recognised and 
engaged in the contributions to the Ackroyd and Fleetwood (2000) and Fleetwood and 
Ackroyd (2004) collections? If, as we endeavour to demonstrate, it is barely recognised or not 
incorporated, then the significance and implications of the oversight merit some 
consideration.  With regard to the ―substantive‖ contributions to these collections, our 
assessment is based on chapters authored by Delbridge; Taylor and Bain; Kowalczyk and 
Kennedy; Hesketh and Brown (in Fleetwood and Ackroyd 2004) and by Coopey et al; 
Costello; Easton and Porter
v
 (in Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000). With the partial exception of 
Porter‘s chapter, none of these contributions directly attends to epistemological relativism or, 
more specifically, acknowledges and engages with the fallibility or relativity of the claims 
made therein.  
 
 What can we expect from the application of an approach whose authorities avowedly 
give as much weight to epistemological relativism as to ontological realism and judgemental 
rationality? Our response is that, at the very least, CR analysis should incorporate and/or 
exemplify some minimal appreciation of how there is no unmediated access to reality. That is 
to say, CR studies in MOS can be expected to attend to how the‘ pre-existing stock of 
conceptual resources‘ (Fleetwood 2004) contributes to delimit the otherwise indeterminate 
meaning of the issues, analyses and solutions articulated by researcher and participants.  
What do we find? Porter (2000: 145) valuably acknowledges that ‗While it is important to 
realise that ―the social world may be opaque to the social agents upon whom it depends‖ 
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(Bhaskar 1989a: 4), distinguishing between clarity and opacity is problematic, given that 
analysts themselves cannot have direct contact with the reality of social structures.‘ This is a 
promising start.  It is disappointing that the remainder of Porter‘s chapter lacks sensitivity to 
how concept dependency implies more than a mere acknowledgement of fallibility. It 
incorporates no consideration of how concepts are framed, re/produced and transformed. At 
most, Porter portrays agents who are faced with the task of  ‗collapsing structural variables 
into categories that can inform interactional practices ... Thus, in a social situation where 
nurses deemed open expressions of racism as inappropriate, they filtered them out, selecting 
instead professional modes of interaction.‘ (Porter 2000: 156-157). In the other chapters of 
the edited collections, the categories used by contributors – such as ‗workers‘, ‗managers‘, 
‗employers‘, ‗employees‘, ‗team‘, ‗workplace‘, ‗merger‘, ‗humour‘, ‗hospital‘, ‗nurses‘, and 
so on – are taken for granted, naturalised and unquestionably assumed to provide adequate 
respresentations of their referents. The reluctance to ‗defactualize‘ these categories is highly 
problematical for analyses that are presented as exemplars of CR. This denial or disregard of 
CR‘s epistemological relativism is, we suggest, illustrative of the kind of (empirical realist) 
mode of analysis lampooned by Bhaskar (1986: 284) as taking ‗a dozy bask in the retrojected 
glories of earlier objectifications of thoughts, misconstrued as natural givens‘. It is to the 
unintended consequences of the ‗naturalisation‘ of these categories in MOS scholarship that 
our attention now turns. 
 
Implications for substantive CR studies in MOS 
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 We have argued that the significance of epistemological relativism is not reducible to 
fallibilism; and that an adequate understanding of epistemological relativism requires an 
appreciation of how the categories used by researchers are inherently artificial objects (see 
Bhaskar 1978, especially p. 249). An implication of this conjecture is a call for closer  
attentiveness to the naturalisation of categories used in the practices of participants (see Sayer 
2005). Otherwise, studies become indistinguishable from empirical realist, and more 
specifically structuralist, forms of analysis where categories are routinely naturalized.  
 In structuralism, categories used to codify observations are defined a priori and are 
assumed to be relevant in all observed settings (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: xix-xx). Contra 
structuralism, CR and poststructuralism share a rejection of the view that conceptual elements 
should be identified independently of the situation under scrutiny (1982: 54-56). Porter‘s 
analysis (cf. Supra) exemplifies a structuralist approach insofar as she interprets social 
situations in reference to categories that are implicitly assumed to be relevant and meaningful 
independently of context: white vs ethnic minority; nurses vs. doctors; overt racism vs. covert 
racism, competent professional vs. incompetent professional. Porter‘s analysis includes little 
to counteract the impression that racist relations, attitudes and behaviours, for example, are 
self-perpetuating and have an autonomy of their own – an omission that, unfortunately, gives 
succour to the objection, as voiced by Burkitt (1999), King (1999a; 1999b) and Newton 
(2007), that in CR writings reality appears to be disconnected from human sense-making 
activities (cf. supra). Our contention is that CR‘s commitment to epistemological relativism is 
disruptive of structuralist and empirical realist analysis. In principle, CR‘s commitment to 
epistemological relativism problematises the universality or acontextuality of the categories 
upon which it relies. Analyses incorporating ‗epistemological relativism‘ can accept that the 
categories of ‗white‘, ‗doctor‘ and ‗competent‘, for example, are pragmatically useful and 
that they purport to reference certain aspects of existing states of affairs. But critical realist 
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analysis which delivers on its commitment to epistemological relativism cannot, in our view, 
entertain any suggestion that (i) these categories provide the way of, say, categorising 
hospital staff and/or (ii) presume that the categories are a priori preferable to other 
categorisations (eg. friendly/unfriendly, nice looking/ugly, religious/a-religious, and so on). 
In sum, incorporating a commitment to epistemological relativism encourages reflection upon 
the formation of, and relation between, categories in accounts of social situations; and there is 
a questioning of any suggestion that these categories are universal or that they can be 
understood independently of the contexts of their use (see Bhaskar, 1986, especially p 280 et 
seq). 
 Attentiveness to CR‘s epistemological relativism suggests a direction for critical 
realist studies that incorporates awareness of how categories used by participants, as well as 
those employed by the researcher, obtain their positivity, grip or charge from a particular 
order of discourse (Foucault 1970; Edward and Willmott 2008). ―Doctor‖ and ―nurse‖, for 
instance, are not meaningful because they refer to ―real doctors‖ or to ―real nurses‖ but 
because they are performed within a hegemonic set of discursive practices (the discourse of 
the hospital). Participation in these practices fosters recognition or, indeed, compels 
privileged use of these categories and confers a positivity upon them. Our point is that in 
order to be consistent with a commitment to epistemological relativism, the dependence of 
meaningful concepts on discursive orders could, and arguably should, be fully acknowledged 
and incorporated into CR analysis.  
 This proposal requires proponents of CR analysis to pay more than lip service to the 
understanding that elements of discourse deployed to reference objects of study are not 
neutral. It means, for example, being attentive to how an interaction that is represented as 
taking place between a ―doctor‖ and a ―nurse‖ (that is, being framed within a discourse of the 
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hospital) may alternatively be interpreted as an interaction between, say, a ―woman‖ and a 
―man‖ (e.g. when framed within a feminist discourse). As (ontological) realists, critical 
analysts are obliged to appreciate how the meaningfulness of claims is dependent upon 
particular discourse(s) in which their statements are articulated (Bhaskar 1986: 98-102). 
Appeals to ―the doctor‖ or ―the man‖ may be directed to the same person; yet the meanings 
conveyed or performed, as well as the conceptual frameworks mobilized, differ significantly, 
as may the consequences flowing from their operation. It is for this reason that constructs 
used by participants should not be invoked simply as available (categorical) resources to be 
used in critical realist analysis. Instead, in CR studies, the constructs of critical realist 
analysis become interrogated as topics of de-naturalized analyses. Such critical analysis 
might, for example, include examination of the practices that sustain the hegemony of 
established forms of categorization in a hospital (e.g. nurses vs doctors, medical decisions vs 
administrative decisions, and so on.) 
 
Critical Realism and Poststructuralism 
 The affinity between the analytical implications of CR‘s commitment to 
epistemological relativism and aspects of postructuralist thinking is apparent inter alia in the 
interpretive analytics developed by Foucault (Foucault 1972; Foucault 1977; Foucault 1978, 
see also Al-Amoudi 2007, Joseph 2004 and Marsden 1999). We consider three aspects of the 
formation of agents‘ categories of interpretation. First, there is the system of differentiations 
through which (transitive) objects of knowledge are constituted and which permit some 
people to act upon the actions of others (eg. ‗doctor / patient‘ though not ‗im-moral madness / 
ir-rational madness‘ in contemporary hospitals). Second, there are the enunciative modalities 
that describe and determine ‗who can make what claim?‘ (e.g., who can diagnose a disease? 
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Who can decide to lock up a patient? Which patients are entitled to discuss the various 
treatments available to them?). Third, there is the apparatus (dispositif) constituted by the 
related verbal practices and their relations to non-verbal practices and entities. Verbal 
practices directly involved in, and constitutive of, a doctor/patient relationship include 
questioning the patient, billing medical fees, negotiating possible treatments, and so on. Non-
verbal practices and entities
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 include touching and manipulating the patient‘s body, using 
operation rooms, uniforms, surgical tools, email systems and so on. This list is far from 
exhaustive. Its purpose is to illustrate how Foucaultian analytics, for example, have relevance 
for studying the transitive dimension of agency and the latter‘s wider social effects. Such 
enquiries into these systems of differentiation, enunciative modalities and dispositifs are 
intended to describe and to explain. They seek to retrace the typically overlooked links 
between the meanings on which agents rely in their routine activities and the relations of 
power through which they interact. That kind of analysis has not, to our knowledge, been 
advocated or advanced by proponents of CR, perhaps as a consequence of a tendency, noted 
earlier, to polarize critical realism and constructionism.  Yet, such analysis could, we believe, 
offer a powerful corrective to structuralist and empiricist tendencies that we detect in 
ostensibly CR studies within MOS. 
 In addition to stressing how concepts acquire their meaningfulness from the 
discourses through which they are articulated, we have also hinted at how discourses, far 
from being innocent or neutral, articulate relations of power. Unquestioning reproduction of 
the categories used by participants tends to make researchers complicit in the perpetuation of 
the practices and internal relations associated with the categories. For this reason, a full 
engagement of epistemological relativism has political implications for research.  
Problematising the categories is subversive as it shows the limits of the signifier‘s capacity to 
signify its signified, and the capacity of the reference to express its referent. ‗Worker‘ and 
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‗manager‘, for example, are simultaneously present in a variety of discourses, each of which 
delimit the boundaries for these categories (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 126-127).  The 
different meanings of ―manager‖ found in textbooks, workplaces, consultancy firms and 
other institutions, suggest the possibility of challenging dominant meanings by developing 
alternative (critical) discourses for investing words, such as ‗manager‘, with meaning, and for 
transforming their meaning in specific settings and/or of subverting their use. That this is 
possible is evident in the widespread contemporary appeal of ‗leader‘ or ‗mentor‘ as a 
replacement for ‗manager‘ as well as the less publicised and potent, but no less pervasive, 
preference of the managed to substitute other categories (e.g. ‗wanker‘, ‗asshole‘ and 
‗bullshitter‘). 
 If our analysis and proposal are accepted, this does not necessarily imply or demand 
abandonment of themes prized by CR studies of management and organisations. To the 
contrary, attentiveness to the epistemic dimension of social reality can inform analysis of 
topics typically studied by CR scholars: the re/production of social structures; the variety of 
social mechanisms; the existence and persistence of mechanisms that perpetuate a 
questionable (self) understanding of agents and so on. A significant consequence of 
reinstating epistemological relativism at the heart of critical realism, however, is that CR‘s 
ontological claims must be acknowledged as fallible and provisional though, perhaps, more 
compelling than many alternatives. 
 
Implications for meta-theoretical and methodological CR studies 
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 Reinstating epistemological relativism problematizes any inclination to dismiss a 
specific theory or methodology solely on the basis that it assumes a different ontology. In this 
respect, we agree with Fleetwood (2005) that ‗having the ―right‖ ontology does not guarantee 
that the ensuing meta-theory, theory and practice will also be ―right‖‘. We are more dubious, 
however, about his assertion that ‗having the ―wrong‖ ontology makes this virtually 
impossible – although we might be right by accident‘ (Fleetwood 2005: 198). Our point is not 
that ontology is irrelevant or unimportant but that disagreements about ontological claims do 
not warrant the categorical dismissal of substantive statements. Taking epistemological 
relativism seriously would, in our view, caution against basing assessments of knowledge-
claims upon such a test of their (projected) ontological credentials. For instance, Max 
Weber‘s writings may exhibit traces of an actualist ontology which assumes implicitly that 
reality is composed exclusively of observable events. In terms of CR ontology, Weber‘s 
ontology conflates the domains of the phenomenal, of the actual and of the real. In our view, 
this does not warrant dismissal of Weber‘s contribution, although it may helpfully prompt 
identification of specific limitations, contradictions or conceptual slidings in his work -  such 
as his substitution of ‗domination by virtue of a constellation of interests‘ (Weber 1978/1922: 
943) in favour of the more readily observable ‗domination by virtue of authority‘ (Weber 
1978/1922: 946). Here we gesture towards the possibility of an informed pluralism (Willmott 
2008) that accommodates diverse epistemic cultures and associated bodies of knowledge that 
are not judged on the basis of their approximation to the ‗right ontology‘ but, rather, upon a 
(necessarily contested) evaluation of their congruence and assistance with the realization of 
diverse, favoured value-orientations. In sum, a fuller embrace of epistemological relativism 
cautions against invoking other elements of CR metatheory, including its stratified ontology, 
to dismiss alternative theories and associated methodologies. What, then, of the capacity of, 
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and prospects for, CR‘s fuller embrace of epistemological relativism? In the next section, we 
outline two possible assessments – optimistic and sceptical 
 
 
Reclaiming Epistemological Relativism: Sceptical and Optimistic Assessments 
 
 Optimistic and sceptical assessments of the prospects of CR analysis more fully 
embracing its espoused epistemological relativism are in agreement on a number of its key 
understandings. First, if knowledge, including what is conceived or recognised to be 
‗scientific‘, is a social product, then any claim to acontextual authority invites 
problematization. Second, there is value in drawing a distinction between the object of 
knowledge (e.g. ‗nature‘ or ‗society‘), and whatever knowledge is (socially) produced. As the 
production of knowledge of objects is understood to play a constitutive role in the 
(re)production of the objects of such knowledge, this distinction is self-consciously heuristic. 
What is identified as an object of study is mediated by knowledge; and that knowledge can 
feed back to become constitutive of what one aspires to know. Third, there is a concern to 
resist any tendency to evaluate knowledge claims against a theory-independent conception of 
the object of study. Fourth, even if it is accepted that the objects of our theories have powers 
which exist independently of their identification, the very differentiation between an 
(intransitive) object and its powers or between the object and our knowledge of it, is held, in 
both ‗optimistic‘ and ‗sceptical‘ assessments, to be a discursive act.  
  
26 
A Sceptical Reading of CR 
A sceptical position arises from a difficulty in reconciling, on the one hand, CR‘s ‗depth 
ontology‘ and the associated claim to retroductively identify generative mechanisms with, on 
the other, an epistemological relativism that underscores the historically contingent and 
fallible character of its knowledge claims (see Chouliaraki 2002). Knowledge of this depth, in 
the form of ‗ontological realism‘, is invoked as a basis for warranting CR knowledge. It is 
also what supports CR‘s subscription to judgemental rationality as ‗the notion of stratification 
is already necessary to sustain the idea of critique‘ (Bhaskar 1999).  It is this claim to know, 
and capacity to disclose, the ‗real‘ (as differentiated from the ‗empirical‘ and the ‗actual‘) 
that distinguishes CR from what its proponents describe as superficial, unscientific or ‗irreal‘ 
(Joseph and Roberts, 2004a) forms of analysis. As Bhaskar (Bhaskar 1998a: xvii) puts it, 
‗theoretical explanation proceeds by description of significant features, retroduction to 
possible causes, elimination of alternatives and identification of the generative mechanism or 
causal structure at work‘. The ‗depth ontology‘ is what gives CR its critical edge, or 
epistemological advantage, vis à vis other forms of analysis which, being confined to the 
strata of the ‗empirical‘ and the ‗actual‘, are judged to be limited and, in this sense, 
misleading or false. 
 
 Our earlier discussion emphasised how subscription to epistemological relativism 
demands attentiveness to the discursive mediation of knowledge production. It means taking 
seriously the understanding that representations, including those of ontology, are‗produced in 
a manner that is conditioned by our socio-cultural (or biological or physical) determinations‘ 
(Lawson, 2003: 162, cited earlier) so that such ‗determinations‘ (e.g. gender) are conceived to 
enable and also to impede what passes for knowledge (and science). The embrace of 
27 
epistemological relativism recalls that the production and assessment of such claims is 
necessarily accomplished within particular discourses whose credibility is derived from, and 
limited by, specific power/knowledge relations. Hence the importance of discourse (cf supra 
section 2) and, more specifically, the understanding that CR‘s reference to the ‘intransitive‘ is 
an articulation of a particular (CR) discourse (cf Laclau, 2002) -  a discourse whose authority 
is conceived to be contingent upon the relations of power through which its production is 
accomplished and its credibility is warranted (see Chouliaraki 2002: 97 and note 10).  
  
 Despite its espousal of epistemological relativism, CR is reluctant, and perhaps 
constitutively unable, to acknowledge that the key distinction between ‗being‘ and 
‗knowledge of being‘, and everything that flows from it, is the articulation of a particular 
discourse located historically and culturally within a specific complex of power/knowledge 
relations. What, in short, is missing from CR is ‗some explanation of how we can be 
historically, ideologically and discursively located beings and yet still be able to make 
foundational truth claims‘ (O'Regan 2005: 577). In response, advocates of CR may berate 
critics for overlooking its endorsement of epistemological relativism but this defence is not 
easily reconciled with CR‘s routine trumping of its capacity to know and disclose the ‗real‘. 
Nor is it readily reconciled with the routine relegation of epistemological relativism to a 
secondary role (cf. Woolgar and Pawluch 1985: esp 217, 224) where it is invoked post hoc to 
note how, in common with all truth claims, CR is fallible. Acknowledgment of 
epistemological relativism then amounts to little more than lip service to a stance that, in 
practice, is mobilised to brush off its critics.  Were epistemological relativism to be granted a 
status equivalent to ontological realism, it would recall the radical contingency of CR‘s 
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foundational assumptions – a concession that would also prompt the search for an alternative 
justification of its subscription to judgemental rationality. 
 Adherence to a sceptical position does not mean that ‗a search for grounds for 
determining whether some representations constitute better knowledge of the world than 
others‘ is abandoned (Fairclough 2005: 922). But it does involve problematizing what is 
counted, or naturalized, as ‗better‘vii. The adoption of a sceptical posture does not mean that 
there is no basis for challenging knowledge claims, and, therefore, no possibility of a critical 
(social) science. Rather, there is an appreciation of how the production of such science is 
historically and culturally conditioned – for example, within gendered relations of power (e.g. 
Alcoff and Potter 1993); and that the ‗demystificator role‘ attributed to science by critical 
realists (e.g. Bhaskar in Buch-Hansen 2005: 63) is more contingent and modest than one 
which assumes the capacity to detect ‗false beliefs‘ (Bhaskar in Buch-Hansen 2005: 63)viii.  
 A sceptical, post-foundational stance (see Marchart 2007: esp. 14-15) invites a 
reconstruction of CR in which its ‗depth ontology‘ is not regarded as a (foundational) 
necessity for scientific activity but, rather, as  an articulation of a particular, historico-cultural 
discourse whose credibility is vested in a particular complex of power/knowledge relations. If 
it is not to perpetrate what it strives to discredit, CR must become more consistently reflexive 
in applying the strictures of epistemological relativism to its own claims. Instead of regarding 
CR as the means of accessing the real, it is more coherent to represent CR as ‗one of the 
possibilities for discursively constructing the real‘ (Laclau 2002 in Bhaskar 2002: 84). More 
specifically, a key challenge for CR is to incorporate a full recognition of the contingent, 
discursively produced character of what is characterized as the intransitive dimension of 
(social) science. 
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An Optimistic Reading of CR 
 A more optimistic assessment conceives of CR as an ongoing project, rather than as a 
fixed canon, in which its distinctive formulation of the distinction between transitive and 
intransitive dimensions is retained while incorporating an appreciation of the discursive 
nature of the claims articulated by both researchers and their subjects. In this way, CR comes 
to recognize itself more fully as a discourse - a development that is, arguably, consistent with 
an espoused concern to avoid the naturalization of the concepts that it uses. This optimistic 
view understands such a direction of development to be congruent with CR‘s epistemological 
relativism (in the strong sense); and it is reconciled with the attribution of ‗deep structure‘ to 
generative mechanisms through a self-consciously discursive move.  
 Combining epistemological relativism with ontological realism requires CR to affirm 
its self-understanding as a discourse, including its logics of reference (Bhaskar and Laclau 
2002: cf. section 2, supra). This self-understanding supposes a recognition of the social 
production of references employed to express referents that may or may not be socially 
produced and that may or may not be of a conceptual nature. In this regard, criticisms voiced 
by Burkitt (1999), King (1999a; 1999b) and others (cf. supra) lend weight to the assessment 
that CR authors have yet to insist more clearly on the centrality of epistemological relativism 
and, relatedly, have not fully articulated epistemological relativism with the realist logic of 
reference. An appreciation of epistemological relativism, as we have argued, is critical for 
grasping how the distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimensions is a 
distinction between reference and referent.  When the grasp of this connection is weak or 
displaced, the distinction is mistakenly understood as one between agency-dependent and 
agency-independent features of the world.  
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 Reinstating the importance of epistemological relativism while maintaining the realist 
logics of reference has implications for social theorists as well as for researchers in 
organization studies. It reminds social theorists that the retroductive judgments, on which 
CR‘s ontology is based, express (compelling) possibilities rather than necessities. A close 
reading of the works of prominent figures of CR, such as Bhaskar and Lawson, indicates that 
they do not found their ontological claims on arguments of authority but instead take as 
points of departure their identified intellectual contenders are willing to share. Thus, Bhaskar 
(1978) starts from the possibility of experiments dear to positivist scientists while Lawson 
(1997; 2003a) starts from people‘s ability to navigate in the social world, a key assumption of 
mainstream economics. The foundations of CR are therefore doubly contingent: relatively to 
the starting point and also to the retroductive argument that moves from the starting point to a 
hypothetical condition of possibility. In this perspective, the ontological claims of CR retain 
their usefulness for suggesting possible amendments to alternative theories (cf. analysis of 
Weber‘s theorising of domination, supra); and retroduction offers a powerful, if limited, 
method for exploring the social conditions of human activity. In each case, CR social 
theorists are of course dependent upon the acquiescence of their interlocutors/adversaries 
whenever they endeavour to establish their claims.  
For researchers in organisation studies, remembering epistemological relativism paves the 
way to critical realist studies of sense-making that recognise the effects of the concepts 
employed by participants while acknowledging the dependence of their knowledge upon 
conditions which are not of their making.  On this optimistic view of CR, it is not necessary 
to abandon the realist ‗logics of the referent‘ (Bhaskar and Laclau 2002) in order to 
appreciate that much insight may be gained by problematizing the categories used by 
participants and researchers (which involves dereifying them and deconstructing the 
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discourses in which they are articulated); and analysing the power effects of participants‘ 
categories on those practices which they are meant to describe.  
 Although the methods of analysis sketched earlier are not radically new in 
themselves, they have been widely regarded by CR scholars of MOS as typically and perhaps 
irredeemably associated with idealist meta-theories (Reed 2005b; Reed 2005a). Conversely, 
researchers favouring these methods of analysis have assumed that they could not be 
employed in a realist framework because of an assumed opposition of critical (ontological) 
realism and constructionist (epistemological) relativism (cf. Introduction). An implication of 
challenging this view is that the range of methods permitted by the meta-theoretical stance of 
CR is perhaps larger than commonly believed - a conclusion that endorses Reed‘s (2005b) 
assessment (see also supra). Furthermore, its implication for researchers interested in the 
formation of discursive categories is that their favoured techniques of analysis do not 
themselves warrant rejection of a realist ontology. This stratagem is optimistic inasmuch that 
it commends the retention of CR, yet it demands a self-understanding and associated form of 
analysis that differs from that currently advanced by many who espouse CR within MOS. A 
condition of the revitalized development of CR is a shift in its self-understanding – a shift 
that, from the sceptical standpoint outlined above, is seen to involve a radical questioning of 
CR‘s critical credentials. 
Conclusion 
 Epistemological relativism is widely associated with constructionism but it is also a 
central component of critical realism (CR). The question of the compatibility of 
epistemological realism with its other core elements - of ontological realism and judgemental 
rationality – has rarely been voiced, and so it has been underexplored. Our purpose has been, 
first, to debunk the widespread belief that epistemological relativism is exclusive to varieties 
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of constructionism; second, to stimulate reflection upon how epistemological relativism sits 
within CR; and, third, to sketch some possible implications for CR-aligned forms of analysis, 
especially in the field of management and organization studies (MOS).  
 
 We have conceived of CR as a discourse whose appeal, in the light of its subscription 
to epistemological relativism, is plausibly related to its resonance with currently dominant 
historico-cultural understandings. Epistemological relativism was found to be a core 
assumption of CR which articulates the understanding that knowledge is not only fallible but 
that its context-dependent production and credibility is embedded in social and political 
processes. When CR is engaged by MOS scholars, however, its epistemological relativism is 
either ignored, overlooked or reduced to fallibilism. An outcome of the marginalization of 
epistemological relativism is unbridled enthusiasm for making authoritative claims about the 
‗real‘ and its generative mechanisms. In triumphalist mode, the critical potency of CR 
appears to be significantly enhanced. Yet, arguably, the critical credentials of CR analysis are 
compromised - as when, for example, a concept of structure as a social relation assumes the 
status of a ‗metaphysical entity‘ (King 1999a: 223) ; or, more generally, when in the name of 
demystification and emancipation (e.g. Buch-Hansen 2005: 63), an imperialistic ethos of 
closure supplants one of pluralistic openness. 
 Sceptics are inclined to regard the marginalizing of epistemological relativism within 
CR studies of management and organization as no accident. For them, its full incorporation 
threatens to derail the authority claimed for the CR project. Scepticism begs the question: can 
ontological realism and judgemental rationality be squared with epistemological relativism? 
For optimists, who believe that it can be squared, the challenge is show how, 
methodologically, CR-aligned studies may proceed when the centrality of epistemological 
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relativism is fully embraced and incorporated. Keeping faith with the ontology of CR, they 
urge incorporation of epistemological relativism as a way of escaping  the ‗dozy bask‘ 
(Bhaskar 1986: 284 and supra) associated with the naturalization of concepts. For optimists, a 
central question is: which ‗theoretical perspective or body of social theorizing‘ (Reed 2005b: 
1638) and related methodologies are congruent with avoiding the naturalization of the 
concepts and fostering critical awareness of the political effects? The ambition of CR is 
preserved while capitalising upon the historical-cultural situatedness of this ambition and its 
associated preconceptions.  
 Might the optimistic and sceptical assessments be complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive? By keeping faith with CR‘s embrace of judgemental rationality, the 
optimistic view is inclined to exclude such a possibility. It encourages social science that is 
attentive to the social conditions and political effects of its assumptions but  it also maintains 
that relations between proponents of alternative theories are of ‗conflict rather than merely 
difference‘ (Bhaskar 1998a: xi) with regard to the nature and explanation of the (intransitive) 
‗objects‘ of study. The optimistic stance views some accounts of the world (in the transitive 
dimension) as better suited than others to capture its reality (the intransitive dimension); and 
affirms that CR incorporates ‗judgemental rationality‘ that can help adjudicating between 
competing accounts. The sceptical stance regards the transitive-intransitive distinction as one, 
critical, expression of the transitive. It doubts the possibility of establishing or identifying 
agreed, trans-theoretical, criteria for assessing different theories and their associated bodies of 
knowledge. Nonetheless, it allows that different approaches, including CR, can be of  value 
so long as they incorporate and cultivate an awareness of their contingency and limitations 
(Ezzamel and Willmott 2008). Which of these stances prevails will depend, at least in part, on 
evaluations of whether the implications of epistemological relativism, as sketched earlier, can 
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be addressed without becoming unrecognizable, and/or unacceptable, to current and 
prospective proponents of CR.  
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Appendix: Number of papers mentioning ―critical realism‖ in title, abstract or keywords of 
journals referenced in Business Source Complete 
Year 
Number of papers with 
"CR" in title or abstract 
Artefacts 
Papers dealing with 
CR 
2006 27 2 25 
2005 19 0 19 
2004 14 0 14 
2003 9 2 7 
2002 25 1 24 
2001 12  12 
2000 7 1 6 
1999 10  10 
1998 3  3 
1997 3 1 2 
1996 7  7 
1995 0  0 
1994 2  2 
1993 2  2 
1992 1  1 
1991 0  0 
1990 2  2 
    
    
Total 143 7 136 
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i We are grateful for comments from Roy Bhaskar, John Hendry, Clive and Tony Lawson, 
Raza Mir and Andrew Sayer as well as members of the Cambridge Realist Workshop on 
earlier versions of this paper. During the editorial stages, Tim Newton and three anonymous 
referees have also provided generous comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 
ii
 Although the terms ‗constructivism‘ and ‗constructionism‘ are widely used in an 
interchangeable manner, Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy have suggested that constructivism 
has its origins in Piaget‘s developmental psychology where the notion of people as active 
constructors, rather than passive receptors, of knowledge is emphasized. From this 
perspective ‗‗―reality‖…is constructed in people‘s minds‘ (Phillips, Lawrence et al. 2006: 
480, n1). Social constructionism is understood to ‗‗build on these ideas but emphasizes the 
social nature of reality—it is not constructed merely in people‘s minds but in their social 
interaction, and especially in their linguistic interaction because of the enduring traces that 
this form of interaction is particularly capable of producing‘ (ibid). For another reflection on 
this difference, see Schwandt (2000: esp. 208). 
iii
 CR writings allude sometimes to ‗epistemic relativism‘ and sometimes to ‗epistemological 
relativism‘. Sayer distinguishes them on the basis that epistemological relativism ‗‗implies 
that it is philosophical theories of knowledge that mediate our understanding, whereas 
[epistemic relativism] just implies existing knowledge or discourse does the mediating‘ 
(personal communication). Other authors, such as Tony Lawson use them interchangeably 
(personal communication).  
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iv
 It is certainly not our intention to cast Laclau as the legitimate voice of critical MOS. We 
have chosen to oppose CR with the works of Laclau because we felt the latter are particularly 
attentive to the conditions, processes and effects of knowledge production. Moreover, we 
found valuable sources in the recorded debate between Bhaskar and Laclau as well as in 
Reed‘s (2005b; Reed 2005a) paper that suggests that CR is fundamentally opposed to all 
forms of postmodernism and post-structuralism.   
v
 We do not include the contributions of Peck and Rubery (in Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000) 
as these do not claim critical realist credentials. Our remarks about the absence of ER are 
maintained a fortiori for these pieces. 
vi
 These practices are non-discursive in the sense Foucault assigns to discourse. Under an 
alternative conception such as Laclau and Mouffe‘s, all the practices and entities enumerated 
herein would be considered as discursive (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) 
vii
 On this issue, it is relevant to note that CR‘s defence of its privileging of ‗‗ontological 
realism‘ is at least partially an ethical one (see Bhaskar 1989: 5-6), or an ‗‗irreducibly 
normative activity‘ (Bhaskar, 1989: 159). We have noted how the potency of CR knowledge 
is most overtly articulated, in a rather scientistic and also somewhat circular manner, by 
reference to its ‗‗depth ontology‘. But CR is also, and perhaps ultimately, justified in the 
name of judgemental rationality - albeit that CR conceives of forms of ‗agreement‘ amongst 
‗peers‘ as having a ‗descriptive or evidential‘, in addition to a ‗prescriptive, imperatival‘ 
component that is subjected to CR scrutiny in order to yield ‗ontologically grounded, or 
justified, scientific explanation(s)‘.   
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viii
 Advocates of CR have argued that such criticisms fail to distinguish between ‗being‘ and 
‗knowledge of being‘ and therefore slide into ‗judgemental relativism‘ where all 
representations of the world are taken to be equally good (see Fairclough 2005: 922). This 
criticism is predicated upon a reluctance to recognize the embeddedness of all 
representations, including those of CR, within power/knowledge relations. From a sceptical 
standpoint, the (transitive) claims about the intransitive are necessarily constrained as well as 
enabled by established, hegemonic conceptions of their status and relationship. For anyone 
committed to critique, the challenge is to question and subvert forms of knowledge that 
aspire, or claim, to place closure on our accounts with, and of, reality. 
